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Abstract 
 
This paper explores whether and how media serves as an information intermediary in 
the capital market and predicts value creation from mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
Using a sample of 288 M&A deals in the U.S. market from 2000 to 2015, this paper 
examines whether pre-merger news about acquirers correlates to M&A performance. 
The empirical evidence shows that a positive media attitude before merger 
announcements has predictive power for stock returns in both the short and long run. 
Moreover, media pessimism is associated with higher bid premiums, meaning that 
acquirers must raise the bid price to offset the negative effects produced by the media. 
These findings suggest that media news contains information relevant to M&A 
performance and thus has implications for shareholder wealth. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G14; G34. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is generally believed that media plays an important role in disseminating information 
to financial market participants, and that news content affects future stock performance 
through its effect on investors’ perception of investment risk (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 
2009; Tetlock et al., 2008). However, it is unclear whether media can help investors 
improve their assessment of firms’ investment decisions and thus their intrinsic value. 
On the one hand, media news disseminates undisclosed, fundamental information about 
firms and predicts their long-term performance (Tetlock et al., 2008; Tetlock, 2010). On 
the other hand, media sentiment causes investor biases, which may lead to short-term 
momentum but also long-term reversals in stock returns (Gurun and Butler, 2012). 
These two perspectives suggest varying implications for how media relates to firms’ 
long-term performance and capital market efficiency. To distinguish between these two 
views, this paper examines whether financial media predicts value creation through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As hereafter).  
 
M&As are recognised as an important way to grow business and have been shown to 
strongly influence shareholder wealth through changes in stock market prices. However, 
whether M&As create value for shareholders and support economic growth is 
inconclusive. Hsueh et al. (2014), for example, show that stock prices lead M&A 
activities, but there is almost no correlation between M&A activities and economic 
growth when using stock prices as the control variable. To understand M&As’ 
implications for economic growth and shareholder wealth, it is vital to look more 
closely at the micro-level value creation of M&As—i.e., whether or not firms’ M&A 
decisions create value and improve acquirers’ performance. The most important way 
that M&As benefit acquirers’ performance is through synergies, i.e., the realisation of 
economies of scale and scope. However, when such operating synergies are outweighed 
by negative effects, M&As can actually cause deterioration in firm performance. Rezitis 
(2008) shows that, in the banking industry, technical inefficiencies following mergers 
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lead to decreases in total factor productivity. It is also worth remembering that M&A 
decisions are not always motivated by the pursuit of profit. Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(1992) find that while some merger waves are responses to profit reallocation 
opportunities, others are not; some are possibly spurred by managerial hubris. This 
paper investigates whether media has any predictive power for value creation from 
M&As, and thus help distinguishing M&As that improve firm performance from those 
do not. 
 
Stock returns—i.e., stock price movements—represent the value created on behalf of 
shareholders. Under the efficient market hypothesis, the market’s assessment of value 
creation from M&As is fully included in stock returns during the announcement period. 
Therefore, stock returns around M&A announcement periods are commonly used to 
measure the net value created by M&As.  
 
A large body of literature documents the effects of media news on asset pricing under 
various scenarios, such as IPOs (Cook et al., 2006), seasoned equity offerings (Sun et 
al., 2018), bubbles (Bhattacharya et al., 2009), recessions (Garcia, 2013) and earnings 
announcements (Peress, 2016). In the setting of M&A activities, we expect financial 
media to relate to M&A performance through two channels. First, widespread media 
attention leads to a higher degree of investor recognition of the acquirer and the M&A 
deal. Green and Jame (2013) document that better investor recognition and more 
positive sentiment improve firm value. Gurun and Butler (2012) show that news content 
influences investors’ sentiment and valuation of a stock. Second, news content provides 
investors with undisclosed, fundamental information about acquirers as well as 
information on M&A efficiency. Tetlock et al. (2008) prove that financial news 
transmits new, fundamental information to investors. As positive news content indicates 
better acquirer fundamentals and M&A efficiency, it is expected to lead to higher 
returns around the merger announcement period. 
 
 4 
Nevertheless, the occurrence of positive returns during the announcement period does 
not necessarily indicate higher value created by M&A activities or better post-merging 
performance. Autore and Kovacs (2014) find that the higher value brought by better 
investor recognition in seasoned equity offers is reversed in the three years following 
the issue. Ahern and Sosyura (2014) suggest that media coverage might even be 
manipulated by managers during the M&A negotiation period, resulting in news stories 
that are irrelevant to acquirers’ fundamentals and are only able to generate a short-lived 
run-up in bidders’ stock prices. Tetlock (2007) shows that news content is predictive of 
future stock price movements but that they are later reversed. Therefore, a higher 
valuation during an M&A announcement could merely be a temporary bias that cannot 
be sustained in the long run. To distinguish whether news media effects on valuation 
represent long-run M&A value creation or just a temporary price run-up, we also 
examine long-term returns during the post-merger period. 
 
Using a sample of U.S. M&A deals between 2000 and 2015, this paper examines how 
media attitude correlates to both short-term returns around M&A announcements and 
long-term performance after M&As. We collect a comprehensive dataset that contains 
478,830 financial news articles matched to 288 M&A deals in the U.S. market during 
the period from 2000 to 2015. The M&A deals are divided into subsamples according 
to a measure of media attitude toward acquirers before deal announcements. By 
comparing returns around M&A announcements between the subsample with a positive 
media attitude and the subsample with a negative media attitude, we show that the 
market responds more favourably to takeover deal announcements when the media 
attitude is positive. After controlling for various determinants of M&A bidders’ stock 
returns, the empirical results of multivariate regression show a significantly negative 
relation between media pessimism and announcement returns. We also find evidence 
that media attitude has predictive power for acquirers’ post-merger long-term 
performance in both univariate and multivariate analyses. These results suggest that 
media attitude is significantly correlated with both the short-term and long-term 
performance of acquirers in M&As. Meanwhile, we fail to find any evidence that media 
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coverage influences acquirers’ M&A performance. In addition, we document that 
acquirers receiving negative news stories tend to pay a higher premium for M&A deals.  
Our research makes several contributions to the literature. First, while previous works 
relate media to other corporate events (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2006), 
we focus on M&As, which are big investment decisions that strongly influence firms’ 
future performance and are vital to economic growth. Second, we examine short-term 
market reactions to event announcements, as others have done, but we also investigate 
the relation between media and acquirers’ long-term performance, which better reflects 
value creation from M&As. Our evidence on acquirers’ long-term returns is consistent 
with the notion that the news media provides new information relevant to firm value. 
Third, unlike works focusing on media coverage, i.e., news quantity (e.g., Cook et al., 
2006; Da et al., 2011), we simultaneously consider media coverage and media attitude, 
i.e., news content. Ferguson et al. (2015) show that media coverage has more predictive 
power for future returns than media tone. However, our study shows that in the M&A 
context, media content displays a stronger relation with future returns than media 
coverage. Finally, our findings are meaningful for both policymakers and stock 
investors. Policymakers can learn from the financial media how to better distinguish 
M&As that are beneficial to economic growth from those that are not. For capital 
market investors, incorporating information contained in the financial media when 
valuing M&As can result in better investment decisions.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the main 
hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the sample selection, variable constructions and 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis development  
Acquirer performance in M&As is a major topic in M&A research, as it directly relates 
to firm value. The literature has identified both deal characteristics, such as payment 
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methods (Moeller et al., 2007), and acquirer characteristics, such as experience (Luo, 
2005) and size (Moeller et al., 2007), that affect acquirers’ stock performance in M&A 
deals. 
 
This paper examines whether the financial media, an outsider in the deal, influences 
takeover performance. Media affects investors through both media coverage and news 
content. This study focuses on media attitude, i.e., media content. Johnson et al. (2005) 
document that favourable news published by the business press results in significant 
positive returns. Likewise, both Tetlock (2007, 2010) and Fang and Peress (2016) show 
that media attitudes have significant effects on the stock market. Media attitudes change 
investor behaviour through influencing their sentiment and valuation of stocks (Gurun 
and Butler, 2012). Garcia (2013) shows that “media pessimism” has predictive power 
for daily stock returns, particularly in times of recession. Solomon (2012) finds that 
firms generate more positive news on purpose to raise investor expectations and 
improve announcement returns.  
 
In the setting of M&As, we propose two potential mechanisms through which media 
attitudes influence investors’ reactions to takeover announcements. First, media reports 
provide new information about acquirers’ fundamentals and thus influence investors’ 
expectations regarding the efficiency of M&A decisions. Examining the role of media 
during financial bubbles, Campbell et al. (2012) conclude that the main contribution of 
media is to provide factual information that investors can use to inform their decisions. 
Illustrating the sophisticated information mining ability of the media, Miller (2006) 
shows that almost one third of fraud cases are identified in the media before being 
announced by the firm in question. Second, aside from whether any new information is 
provided, positive news induces optimistic investor sentiment, which leads to higher 
short-term abnormal returns around M&A announcements. These intuitions are 
formalised in the following hypothesis. 
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H1: Bidders that attract a more optimistic (pessimistic) media attitude achieve higher 
(lower) abnormal returns around takeover announcements.  
 
Of course, abnormal announcement returns represent only the short-term reaction to 
M&A deals in the financial market; the efficiency of M&A decisions is more properly 
measured by incorporating firms’ long-term post-merger stock returns. As previously 
discussed, we expect that media dissemination of new information about acquirers’ 
fundamentals is one mechanism by which media influences market prices. In this case, 
media attitudes could have the potential to predict acquirers’ future long-run stock 
performance. However, Tetlock (2007) documents that after media pessimism pressures 
market prices, the price movement eventually reverses, which suggests that the 
influence of media content on stock prices results from noise and liquidity traders rather 
than new information about fundamental asset value. In this case, the high market 
reaction to takeover announcements is due to temporary investor sentiment, which 
cannot last long. Ferguson et al. (2015) show that price pressure induced by the tone of 
news stories is only partially corrected by subsequent reversals, which suggests that 
news content does incorporate information predictive of asset returns. Thus, whether 
media attitudes are related to acquirers’ long-term performance in M&A settings 
becomes an empirical question. We state our hypothesis in a directional form.  
 
H2: More optimistic (pessimistic) media attitudes predict higher (lower) long-term 
abnormal returns of acquiring firms after M&As. 
 
In conclusion, we expect that media attitudes influence market reactions to M&A events 
through two mechanisms. First, news influences investor sentiment, which is quickly 
reflected in investors’ reactions to takeover announcements. Sentiment is generally a 
short-term rather than a long-term factor. Second, given that news reports contain 
undisclosed information about acquirers’ fundamentals and resolve the information 
asymmetry that exists between acquirers and investors, they should be able to predict 
acquirers’ long-term performance. H1 examines whether media attitudes influence 
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market reactions to M&A announcements, which is a joint consequence of both 
mechanisms. In H2, we expect media attitudes to have predictive power for acquirers’ 
future stock performance, consistent with our argument that news incorporates 
undisclosed information relevant to firm value.  
 
As noted earlier, media coverage also influences investors, but in a different way than 
media attitude does. Previous research (e.g., Cook et al., 2006; Da et al., 2011) point 
out that media coverage attracts attention from more investors and alleviates 
information friction among investors, thus generating higher demand for new shares 
even without necessarily revealing any value-relevant information. These effects may 
also influence acquirers’ short-term and long-term stock performance. Therefore, we 
also analyse the effects of media coverage on markets’ reaction to takeover 
announcements and acquirers’ long-term returns. However, as media coverage is not 
the focus of this study, we do not propose formal hypotheses about its effects. 
 
3. Data and methodology  
3.1. Sample selection criteria 
Our M&A data are collected from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database, which 
includes all successful deals during the period January 2000 to December 2015. 
Collecting data on all deals in which both the acquiring and target firms are U.S.-listed 
companies, we obtain an initial sample of 133,067 deals. We exclude deals involving 
firms in the financial and utility industries, as they are under special regulation; this 
reduces the sample to 88,492 deals. Next, we only keep deals that were successfully 
completed, which further reduces our sample to 20,177 deals. Then we exclude deals 
identified by the SDC as forms of privatisation, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
spinoffs, recapitalisations, repurchases and self-tenders, leaving a sample of 19,566 
deals. Furthermore, takeover deals of less than US$100 million are deleted, as small 
deals usually fail to attract media coverage before the merger announcements; this 
leaves a sample of 2,793 deals.   
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The primary source of media data is the Dow Jones’ Factiva database. The financial 
news articles come from two major U.S. financial media players, the Dow Jones News 
Service and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). For each acquirer, we collect news three 
years before and three years after the takeover announcement and obtain a sample of 
478,830 news articles.  
 
Finally, we merge the M&A deal data with the collected media data, and we collect 
accounting data from Compustat and stock price data from CRSP databases. To 
properly estimate the media attitude, we exclude deals without news coverage during 
the pre-merger period, i.e., 60 days to 3 days before merger announcements. We end 
with a final sample containing 288 M&A deals.1 
 
3.2. Variable construction 
Media variables 
We construct two media variables, i.e., Media Pessimism and Media Coverage. First, 
we construct the measure for media content analysis. Following the framework of 
Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008), we choose the ratio of negative words to the 
total number of words to represent the media attitude of each news article. Similar to 
the previous literature, each single word in the document-term matrix was categorised 
into two groups, using positive and negative word categories. Unlike previous studies 
that use the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary, this paper uses Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2011) alternative financial word list. The Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial 
Dictionary was originally developed for psychology and sociology contexts, and it is 
doubtful whether it applies well to the realm of finance. Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
provide evidence that the Harvard IV-4 list substantially misclassifies words when used 
in financial applications. They created a new word category list comprising words with 
typically negative connotations in a financial context, which is applicable to our study. 
                                                           
1 The reason we lose a large amount of observations is that most acquirers are not covered by news 
during the pre-merger period. 
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For the short-term return analyses, the proxy for media pessimism (Media Pessimism) 
is the average fraction of negative words in news articles issued during the pre-merger 
period. The pre-merger period is defined as the period from 60 days to 3 days before 
merger announcements, which is the same as the one adopted by Fang and Peress (2009) 
and Ferguson (2015).2 We end the pre-merger window at three days before M&A 
announcements to avoid any overlap between the window used to estimate media 
variables and that used to calculate CARs around merger announcements. For the long-
term performance analyses, the proxy for media pessimism is the average fraction of 
negative words in news articles issued during the merger period, which is defined as 
the period from the announcement date to the M&A agreement effective date.  
 
Second, we use the number of news articles issued during the pre-merger period as the 
proxy for media coverage (Media Coverage) for the short-term return analyses and the 
media coverage estimated during the merger period for the long-term performance 
analyses.  
 
Besides the fraction of negative words in each news article, another measure commonly 
used in the previous literature (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; and Loughran 
and McDonald, 2011) to assess media attitude is the media pessimism factor, which 
looks at the number of both positive and negative words. The media pessimism factor 
is defined as the difference between the number of positive words and the number of 
negative words, scaled by the sum of positive and negative words. In this study, we 
choose the fraction of negative words as the main measure of media attitude because 
the negative word category summarises common variations better than any other single 
category of words, including positive words (Tetlock, 2007). Measures based on 
negative words alone present a stronger correlation with stock market performance than 
those based on other categories. The main explanation is that negative information has 
                                                           
2 For a robustness check, we use different windows including (-90, -3), (-60, -3), (-30, -3) and (-30, +30) 
around the merger announcements dates as the estimation window for media variables, and the results 
remain similar. 
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a greater impact on investor behaviour than positive information, a phenomenon 
explained by a large body of psychology literature (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001). In a 
wide range of settings where information is processed, negative information attracts 
more public attention and induces stronger reactions (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). 
Another potential explanation is that either the Harvard IV-4 list or Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2011) financial words list has a tendency toward negative words. The 
word count of the positive list is significantly smaller than that of the negative list, 
which creates potential bias when used for content analysis.3 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) 
We follow the standard event study methodology to calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) during a five-day window (CAR[-2,+2]) around the announcement 
dates.4 We estimate the abnormal returns using the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 
1997) as follows: 
( )it it it m f it t it t it it itR R R s SMB h HML m Mom e = + − + + + +  
The CARs are calculated by the sum of abnormal returns during the [-2,+2] window: 
it itCAR AR=  
To better evaluate a firm’s long-term post-merger performance, we calculate the 6-
month and 12-month buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for each acquirer. 
Specifically, BHARs are calculated following Lyon et al. (1999) as follows:5 
, ,
1 1
BHAR (1 ) (1 )
T T
i i t benchmark t
i i
R R
= =
= + − +   
                                                           
3 We still use the media pessimism factor as a robustness test. Our results are weaker but still significant. 
We also check the results of another alternative measure for media attitude developed by Boudoukh et 
al. (2012), which is defined as the difference between positive and negative words divided by the total 
number of positive and negative words. The results are generally consistent with those reported in the 
paper. 
4 We also calculate CARs for a 3-day window (CAR[-1,+1]) and an 11-day window (CAR[-5,+5]) for 
robustness reasons. The results are consistent with our main results. 
5 We also calculate the BHARs for 24-month and 36-month windows for a robustness check, and get 
similar results. 
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where we use the returns of the 25 value-weight, non-rebalanced portfolios grouped by 
both firm size and book-to-market ratio as the benchmarks for expected returns. The p-
value is calculated through bootstrapping. 
 
3.3. Sample description 
The summary statistics for all of the collected news articles are reported in Table 1. We 
report the length of the articles and the number of positive and negative words used in 
both titles (headlines) and content (the body of the articles). Media Pessimism, the last 
variable reported, is the measure of media pessimism, i.e., the number of negative 
words over the total number of words. A comparison of the mean and median values 
for each variable suggests that there is no substantial skewness caused by outliers. The 
mean and median of media pessimism are 1.74% and 1.47%, respectively, comparable 
to those reported by Loughran and McDonald (2011), and much lower than those 
estimated using the Harvard IV-4 word criterion. A reasonable explanation is that 
Loughran and McDonald’s negative words list is only about half the size of the Harvard 
IV-4 negative list.  
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for both firm and deal characteristics and 
compares the two subsamples divided according to media attitude (Panel A) and media 
coverage (Panel B). In Panel A, if a deal has Media Pessimism below the sample median, 
we classify it as receiving a “positive media attitude,” and otherwise a “negative media 
attitude.” Throughout the paper, we use this approach to divide the sample into 
subsamples of positive and negative media attitudes. Acquirer characteristics reported 
include a firm’s growth opportunity (Market-to-Book Ratio), profitability (Profit) and 
interest coverage ratio (Interest Coverage). There is no significant difference between 
the deals receiving positive and negative media attitudes across all acquirer 
characteristics reported, based on either the t-test for the mean value or the Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum test for the median value. The comparisons for deal characteristics, 
including deal size (Deal Value and Relative Size), deal premium (Premium), payment 
methods (Pure Cash and Pure Stock) and the existence of a competing deal (Compete 
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Deal), also generally do not present significant differences between the two subsamples. 
One exception is the deal premium (Premium). Acquirers receiving negative news tend 
to pay higher premiums for the deal. We explore this phenomenon more in Section 4.5. 
The mean value of the relative size ratio is statistically significant, but the median value 
turns out to be insignificant. 
 
In Panel B of Table 2, the sample is divided into two subsamples according to the 
sample median of Media Coverage. Throughout the paper, we use the sample median 
to divide the sample into subsamples of high and low media coverage. Compared to the 
results in Panel A, more variables show significant differences between the two 
subsamples. First, large acquirers prefer larger targets than small acquirers. Consistent 
with this, the average deal value of acquirers with high media coverage is significantly 
higher than that of acquirers with low media coverage. Meanwhile, the comparison of 
Relative Size—i.e., the ratio of a target’s value to its acquirer’s value—reveals that 
acquirers receiving high media coverage, which are also likely to be larger in size, tend 
to acquire targets of smaller size relative to their own size. The differences in capital 
structure, measured by interest coverage ratio, between acquirers with high and low 
media coverage are also distinct. In terms of deal characteristics, deals purely paid in 
cash and with higher premiums attract higher media coverage. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Univariate analysis for CARs 
Table 3 reports the five-day CARs (CAR [-2,+2]) around M&A announcements for 
acquirers across different media attitudes and payment methods. Panel A of Table 3 
reports the CARs for the full sample of acquirers and two subsamples classified by the 
sample median of Media Pessimism. For all acquirers included in our sample, the five-
day CAR is negative (-1.79%) and statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value = 
0.0015). When we divide the sample according to media attitude during the pre-merger 
period, the performances of the two subsamples are statistically different. The average 
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CAR [-2,+2] for acquirers with a positive media attitude is negative (-0.95%) but 
statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.3088). The average CAR [-2,+2] for acquirers 
with a negative media attitude is more negative in magnitude (-2.61%) and highly 
significant (p-value = 0.0003). Comparison between the two subsamples reveals that 
the CARs for acquirers with a positive media attitude are 1.66% higher (significant at 
the 10% level with a p-value = 0.0688) than those for acquirers with a negative media 
attitude. This finding is consistent with our first hypothesis that media pessimism leads 
to lower market returns around M&A announcements. Investors react more favourably 
to M&As receiving positive news during the pre-merger period.  
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Moeller et al. (2007) both suggest a relation between 
methods of payment for takeovers and acquirer abnormal returns over both the short 
and long term. Thus, we further explore whether the short-term CARs around the 
announcements differ according to the method of payment in M&As. Specifically, we 
divide our full sample into three subsamples according to payment methods: pure cash 
payments, pure stock payments and mixed payments. Generally, the results show that 
the average of the CARs for deals purely paid in cash is negative (-0.66%) but 
insignificant (p-value = 0.1477). Also, for deals purely paid in cash, there is no 
significant differences in CARs between the subsamples with positive and negative 
media attitudes. These findings are consistent with Moeller et al. (2004), who document 
that cash offers are marked by insignificant positive abnormal returns, while other 
acquisitions have significant negative abnormal returns. According to Moeller et al. 
(2004), small firms are more likely to pay in cash in M&As and on average record 
higher abnormal returns in M&As than big firms. In summary, media attitudes during 
the pre-merger period do not have obvious effects on short-term market reactions to 
deals purely paid in cash. 
 
In contrast, the average of the CARs for takeovers paid in stocks is negative (-4.24%) 
and significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0042). This result is consistent with Travlos 
(1987) and Martin (1996), both of whom show that abnormal returns around the 
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announcement of deals paid in stocks are significantly negative. Comparison between 
the two subsamples indicates that acquirers with a positive media attitude receive 1.66% 
higher CARs than acquirers with a negative media attitude. However, the t-test suggests 
that the difference is insignificant. 
 
Moreover, the results of deals paid both in cash and stocks are similar to the results of 
the full sample. The average of the CARs is -1.77% and statistically significant (p-value 
= 0.0267). For acquirers with a positive media attitude, the average of the CARs is 
slightly positive (0.25%) but insignificantly different from zero (p-value = 0.8154). In 
contrast, the average of the CARs of acquirers with a negative media attitude is negative 
(-3.75%) and significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0014). The 4.00% difference in 
CARs between the two subsamples is also significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.0105). 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the CARs for acquirers with different media coverage and 
payment methods. The average CARs for the subsample with high media coverage and 
the subsample with low media coverage are both negative (-1.28% and -2.24%) and 
significant (p-values = 0.0153 and 0.0024). The difference between the two subsamples 
is 0.96% but insignificant (p-value = 0.2825). We next examine whether payment 
methods cause any differences. While deals paid in stocks on average receive more 
negative market reactions for both high and low media coverage subsamples, the 
differences between the two subgroups are insignificant for all payments methods. 
These findings imply that the pre-merger media coverage does not affect market 
reactions to M&A announcements. 
 
4.2. Regression analysis for CARs 
The univariate analyses in Table 3 support our argument that media attitude during the 
pre-merger period influences market reactions to takeover announcements, while media 
coverage does not display any significant effect on announcement returns. Next, we 
adopt multivariate regressions to control for firm and deal characteristics that also 
influence market reactions to M&A announcements. 
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In the regression models of Table 4, we use the five-day CARs around the takeover 
announcements (CAR[-2,+2]) as the dependent variable. The first regression model 
includes only our variables of interest, i.e., Media Pessimism and Media Coverage. 
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on Media Pessimism is negative (-0.9362) 
and statistically significant (p-value = 0.0545). This finding suggests that media 
pessimism decreases the CARs around takeover announcements. As for media coverage, 
the coefficient on Media Coverage is positive (0.0054) but insignificant (p-value = 
0.1299). The results of Model (1) are consistent with those of the univariate analyses. 
The market reactions to the takeover announcements vary according to media attitude 
but are unrelated to media coverage during the pre-merger period. 
 
In regression Model (2), we include a number of deal and firm characteristics that have 
been identified to influence announcement returns in previous studies. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005, 2008) show that overpaid takeovers have significantly lower abnormal 
returns around announcement. To control for this effect, the bid premium (Premium) is 
included in the regression model. Several studies show that payment method is one of 
the dominant factors influencing acquirers’ abnormal announcement returns. For 
example, Travlos (1987) and others indicate that acquisitions of public targets paid in 
pure cash are accompanied by higher announcement returns. Thus, a dummy variable 
that equals one for deals purely paid in cash (Pure Cash) is included in the model to 
control for the effect of payment methods. 
 
For firm characteristics, we control for acquirers’ capital structure and market-to-book 
ratio. Maloney et al. (1993) find that bidders bearing more debt have higher 
announcement returns. Our regression model uses interest coverage (Interest Coverage) 
to proxy for acquirers’ debt burden. Lang et al. (1991) and Servaes (1991) both reveal 
a positive relation between the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio, a proxy for future 
growth opportunities, and announcement returns. We calculate the market-to-book ratio 
as the ratio of the firm’s market value of assets over the book value and include it in 
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Model (2). Furthermore, the relative size between the target and the acquirer is also an 
indispensable control variable in previous M&A studies (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; 
Travlos 1987). Thus, Relative Size is also controlled in Model (2). 
 
The regression results of Model (2) are reported in Table 4. The negative correlation 
between the announcement CARs and media pessimism remains significantly negative. 
The coefficient on Media Pessimism is -1.5047 and statistically significant at the 1% 
level (p-value = 0.0048). As for economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase 
in Media Pessimism (0.0138) leads to a -2.1% abnormal return during the five-day 
window around M&A announcement. Moreover, the coefficient on Media Coverage is 
still insignificant (p-value = 0.8089). 
 
Among the control variables, only the coefficients on Interest Coverage and Relative 
Size are statistically significant. We document a significantly positive correlation 
between Interest Coverage and announcement CARs (0.0949, p-value = 0.0789), which 
is consistent with the argument of Masulis et al. (2007) that debtholders play a 
governance role and thus improve the efficiency of firms’ M&A decisions. The results 
suggest that a higher Relative Size leads to significantly lower announcement CARs (-
0.0844, p-value = 0.0001), which is consistent with Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003), 
who interpret the negative correlation to mean that firms acquiring relatively larger 
firms have a more difficult time digesting those firms, leading to ineffective 
assimilation into the company’s operations. 
 
To summarise, the empirical results of both the univariate and multivariate regression 
analyses indicate that media pessimism during the pre-merger period leads to more 
negative market reactions to M&A announcements, which supports our first hypothesis. 
Meanwhile, we do not find any evidence that media coverage influences acquirers’ 
short-term stock performance around M&A announcements.  
 
4.3. Univariate analysis for BHARs 
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So far, this paper has investigated the interaction between media and short-term returns 
around takeover announcements. This section explores the relation between media 
during the event window and acquirers’ post-merger performance. We use BHARs 
accumulated for 12 months after M&As’ effective date to measure acquirers’ long-term 
stock performance. 
 
Table 5 reports acquirers’ 12-month BHARs for the full sample and for subsamples 
divided according to media pessimism (reported in Panel A) and media coverage 
(reported in Panel B). The average of the BHARs for the full sample is negative 
(-14.59%) and statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0001). This finding 
is consistent with Loughran and Vijh (1997), who argue that firms buying public targets 
suffer substantial losses in future stock performance. We next examine whether 
payment methods matter. For deals using pure cash, acquirers’ 12-month BHAR is -6.62% 
on average. This is much better than the return for deals using the two other payment 
methods; for both deals purely paid in stock and those with a mixed payment method, 
the long-term BHARs are negative (-22.46% and -19.76%) and statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.0056 and 0.0005).  
 
When the full sample is divided according to the sample median of Media Pessimism 
during the event window, acquirers’ long-term performances do not show significant 
differences between the two subsamples, except for deals purely paid in cash. For pure 
cash deals receiving positive news, the average BHAR for acquirers is not significantly 
different from zero (p-value = 0.9893). The average BHAR for acquirers with a positive 
media attitude is 13.24% larger than that for pure cash deals receiving negative news, 
and the difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.0885). For deals using the 
other two payment methods, the long-term performance of acquirers does not differ 
significantly between the subgroups with positive and negative media attitudes. 
 
We report the comparison of BHARs between subgroups with high and low media 
coverage in Panel B of Table 5. Similar to the findings of the short-term CAR analyses, 
 19 
there are no significant differences in BHARs between the subsamples with high and 
low media coverage, which indicates that media coverage cannot predict acquirers’ 
long-term performance. 
 
To sum up, we find that media pessimism in the event window period predicts low long-
term stock returns for acquirers. However, media coverage has no predictive power for 
acquirers’ long-term performance.  
 
4.4. Regression analysis for BHARs 
Next, we use multivariate regression analysis to further investigate the relation between 
media and acquiring firms’ long-term stock performance. Table 6 presents the results 
of the multivariate regressions. The dependent variables for the two regression models 
are the 6- and 12-month BHARs of acquiring firms after M&As, respectively. Similar 
to the CAR regression models, the regression models control for deal characteristics 
including the bid premium (Premium), cash payment (Pure Cash) and targets’ size 
relative to acquirers’ size (Relative Size). In addition, we control for acquirer 
characteristics proxied by interest coverage (Interest Coverage), profitability (Profit) 
and the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book Ratio). 
 
The coefficients on Media Pessimism in the two models are both negative (-5.0076 and 
-10.884) and significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.0842 and 0.0717). The empirical 
results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in Media Pessimism (0.0138) 
leads to 6.9% and 15.0% loss in the 6-month and 12-month periods after M&As. 
However, the coefficients on Media Coverage are statistically insignificant in both 
models. These findings suggest that media attitude during the event window has 
predictive power for acquirers’ future stock performance. However, there is no evidence 
that media coverage correlates to acquirers’ post-merger long-term performance. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests a significantly negative correlation 
between Market-to-Book Ratio and BHARs in both models, with coefficients that are 
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equal to -0.0123 and -0.067, respectively, and significant (p-value = 0.0825 and 0.0001), 
consistent with the argument that growth stocks underperform value stocks. In addition, 
the coefficients on Profit and Pure Cash are significantly positive in Model (2), but 
insignificant in Model (1). 
 
In conclusion, the above analyses show that acquiring firms’ long-term BHARs can be 
predicted by news attitude during the M&A period. Tetlock et al. (2008) argue that the 
financial news media is able to forecast a firm’s future earnings and stock returns, which 
suggests that media attitude is related to a firm’s fundamental information. In the setting 
of an M&A, media closely tracks the takeover progress during the period from the 
announcement date to the effective date, and release news containing value-relevant 
information. Our empirical evidence supports our expectation that news pessimism has 
predictive power over whether a takeover deal benefits the acquiring firm’s 
shareholders in the long term. However, media coverage during the M&A period cannot 
predict the future performance of acquiring firms. These findings are particularly useful 
for capital market investors developing a long-term portfolio strategy. For M&As 
involving acquirers about whom media attitudes are negative, capital market investors 
should be more cautious and consider discounting the stock value to a greater extent. 
 
4.5. Premium analysis 
Our study on acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns and long-term stock performance 
demonstrates the interaction between the financial media and M&A performance. This 
section further examines the relation between the pre-merger media and bid premiums. 
Buehlmaier (2013) argues that the media can mitigate the information asymmetry 
between target shareholders and bidding firms. Buehlmaier (2013) shows that good 
news improves acquirer ratings by target shareholders and encourages them to accept 
takeover offers. Thus, a positive media attitude can predict takeover success. In terms 
of bid premiums, we expect that media pessimism during the pre-merger period has a 
negative effect on target shareholders’ perceptions of deal success, which forces 
acquirers to pay higher premiums to compensate for target shareholder risks. To 
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examine whether our expectation is correct, we regress bid premiums on the measures 
for media attitude and media coverage, along with the control variables. 
 
Table 7 presents the regression results, with the premium paid by acquirers for target 
shares (Premium) as the dependent variable. Model (1) only includes Media Pessimism 
and Media Coverage, and Model (2) further include control variables. Consistent with 
our expectation, the coefficient on Media Pessimism is positive (3.3359 and 3.8314) 
and statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.0978 and 0.0773) in both 
columns, indicating that a more pessimistic media attitude leads to higher bid premiums. 
These results imply that an acquiring firm’s managers must raise their bid price to offset 
the media’s negative effect on target shareholders’ perceptions. The coefficients on 
Media Coverage are also positive (0.0290 and 0.0343) and statistically significant at 
the 5% to 10% level (p-value = 0.0523 and 0.0337) in both models, which suggests that 
acquirers attracting higher media coverage tend to pay higher premiums in takeovers. 
In conclusion, the analyses on bid premiums show that news during the pre-merger 
period has a significant impact on the premiums paid by acquiring firms to target 
shareholders. The empirical results suggest that more pessimistic media attitudes and 
higher media coverage are related to higher bidding premiums.  
 
In this study, we show that pessimistic media reports about acquirers during the pre-
merger period lead to acquirers paying higher premiums and investors reacting more 
negatively around deal announcements. In addition, media pessimism during the M&A 
period predicts worse long-term stock performance of the acquirers.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the interaction between the financial media and M&A 
performance. The previous literature shows that both media attitude and media 
coverage affect firm stock performance. However, this finding has not been applied to 
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the M&A context. This paper addresses the issue by examining whether the financial 
media affects or predicts takeover returns in both the short and long term. 
 
First, this paper provides empirical evidence that the attitude of financial news 
appearing during the pre-merger period affects financial market reactions to takeover 
deal announcements. We find that a more pessimistic media attitude during the pre-
merger period leads to significantly lower five-day CARs of acquirers around M&A 
announcements. This result holds in both univariate and multivariate regression 
analyses.  
 
Second, this paper also investigates the relation between financial media and acquirers’ 
long-term stock performance after M&As. We document a significant correlation 
between media pessimism during the merger period and acquirers’ long-term BHARs 
after M&As in both univariate and multivariate analyses. The predictive power of 
media attitude for long-term returns is consistent with the argument that the media is 
able to report undisclosed, fundamental information about acquirers, thus helping to 
resolve the problem of information asymmetry between firms and investors. However, 
we fail to find any evidence that media coverage influences either short-term or long-
term M&A performance. 
 
Furthermore, the regression on bid premium shows that bid premiums are also affected 
by financial news during the pre-announcement period. When the shareholders of target 
firms are influenced by pessimistic news, acquirers have to boost their bid prices to 
compensate them.  
 
Our comprehensive study on the role of financial media in M&As complements the 
existing literature on both M&As and media. Our results imply that investors can learn 
from the content of news, and for M&A events, media content is more important than 
media coverage in predicting future returns. Due to data availability issues, however, 
our empirical tests are based on a relatively small sample. The sample could be enlarged 
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by expanding our media source to include local newspapers or digital media. This study 
also raises unanswered questions that could be clarified by future research. For instance, 
what accounts for the diversity of financial media attitudes found in different news 
sources, and what are the implications of such differences in terms of the effect on 
investors? This would be an interesting avenue for future studies.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics for media data. 
 
Variables Mean Median SD 10 percentile 90 percentile 
News Length 629.29 525 461.92 185 1164 
Title Positive 0.1386 0 0.3792 0 1 
Title Negative 0.3029 0 0.5915 0 1 
Content Positive 5.3203 4 5.6692 0 13 
Content Negative 10.9852 8 12.0129 1 25 
Media Pessimism 0.0174 0.0147 0.0138 0.0026 0.0348 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for all 478,830 media articles collected. News Length is the number of total words in each news article. Title 
Positive and Title Negative are the number of positive and negative words in each news title, respectively. Content Positive and Content Negative are the number 
of positive and negative words in each news article, respectively. Media Pessimism is the fraction of negative words to total number of words in each news 
article. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of deal and acquirer characteristics. 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistic for the full sample and comparison between subsamples with positive and negative attitude. 
  
 Full Sample Positive Attitude Negative Attitude T-test Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median P-Value P-Value 
Market-to-Book Ratio 255 3.192 2.100 124 3.479 2.154 131 2.921 2.092 0.3695 0.7559 
Profit 286 0.156 0.159 141 0.153 0.168 145 0.158 0.153 0.6456 0.1940 
Interest Coverage 263 0.091 0.057 124 0.095 0.065 139 0.087 0.049 0.5214 0.1227 
Deal Value 288 2962.6 887.7 142 2798.2 976.3 146 3122.5 864.3 0.6811 0.4802 
Relative Size 255 0.191 0.080 124 0.227 0.083 131 0.157 0.073 0.0572 0.7559 
Premium 278 0.334 0.272 137 0.303 0.236 141 0.365 0.301 0.0844 0.0211 
Pure Cash 288 38.80% - 142 40.14% - 146 45.21% - 0.3850 - 
Pure Stock 288 22.78% - 142 22.54% - 146 17.81% - 0.3173 - 
Compete Deal 281 6.05% - 137 6.57%  144 5.55% - 0.8954 - 
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Table 2 Continued from previous page. 
Panel B Comparison between subsamples with high and low media coverage. 
Note: This table presents firm and M&A deal characteristics for acquiring firms from 2000 to 2015. Panel A includes the descriptive statistics for the full sample 
and two subsamples that are classified by the sample median of Media Pessimism. Panel B reports the comparison results for the two subsamples divided by 
the sample median of Media Coverage. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of the firm’s market value divided by its book value. Profit is earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) over total assets. Interest Coverage is the ratio of interest expenses over earnings before interest and taxes. Deal 
Value is the total amount paid by acquirers recorded in SDC. Relative Size is the total value of the target over acquirers. Premium is the four-week premium of 
each deal recorded by the SDC database. Pure Cash is an indicator that equals one if the deal is paid 100% in cash, and zero otherwise. Pure Stock is an indicator 
that equals one if the deal is paid 100% in stock, and zero otherwise. Compete Deal is an indicator that equals one if there exists a competing deal, and zero 
otherwise. This table also provides results of a t-test for the difference of mean value and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for the difference of median value 
between the two subsamples. 
  
 Low Media Coverage High Media Coverage T-Test Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test 
 Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median P-Value P-Value 
Market-to-Book Ratio 134 2.875 1.738 121 3.544 2.329 0.2822 0.0006 
Profit 152 0.146 0.152 134 0.166 0.165 0.0627 0.1558 
Interest Coverage 139 0.113 0.077 124 0.066 0.045 0.0002 0.0004 
Deal Value 154 1958.6 793.6 134 4116.5 1090.3 0.0095 0.1570 
Relative Size 134 0.266 0.144 121 0.107 0.027 0.0001 0.0001 
Premium 154 0.305 0.235 134 0.369 0.279 0.0786 0.0068 
Pure Cash 154 35.71% - 134 50.75% - 0.0101 - 
Pure Stock 154 23.38% - 134 16.42% - 0.1419 - 
Compete Deal 154 3.90% - 134 8.21% - 0.1313 - 
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Table 3  
Univariate analysis for CARs. 
 
Panel A CAR[-2, +2] for the full sample and comparison between subsamples with positive and negative attitude. 
 Full Sample Positive Media Attitude Negative Media Attitude Differences  
 Obs. Mean P-Value Obs. Mean P-Value Obs. Mean P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 288 -1.79%*** 0.0015 120 -0.95% 0.3088 168 -2.61%*** 0.0003 1.66%* 0.0688 
Pure Cash 123 -0.66% 0.1477 58 -0.63% 0.7807 65 -0.69% 0.4533 0.06% 0.9509 
Pure Stock 58 -4.24%*** 0.0042 25 -3.49%* 0.0751 33 -5.15%*** 0.0040 1.66% 0.5659 
Mixed 107 -1.77%** 0.0267 39 0.25% 0.8154 68 -3.75%*** 0.0014 4.00%** 0.0105 
 
Panel B Comparison of CAR[-2,+2] between subsamples with high and low media coverage. 
 High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage Differences 
 Obs. Mean P-Value Obs. Mean P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 127 -1.28%** 0.0153 161 -2.24%*** 0.0024 0.96% 0.2825 
Pure Cash 51 -0.57% 0.3252 72 -0.77% 0.2936 0.20% 0.8281 
Pure Stock 20 -3.35%* 0.0646 38 -4.77%** 0.0253 1.42% 0.5969 
Mixed 56 -1.34% 0.1804 51 -2.07%* 0.0772 0.74% 0.6272 
Note: This table shows the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-2,+2]) of acquirers around the takeover announcements. The abnormal return is 
measured using the Carhart (1997) model, and the estimate period is [-346, -91]. Panel A reports the CARs of the full sample and two subsamples divided by 
the sample median of Media Pessimism. Panel B reports the comparison results between the two subsamples divided by the sample median of Media Coverage. 
Pure Cash refers to the subsample of deals paid purely in cash. Pure Stock refers to the subsample of deals paid purely in stocks. Mixed refers to the subsample 
of the rest of the deals. This table also provides results of the t-test for the difference of mean values between subgroups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4  
Multivariate regression of CARs. 
 
 CAR[-2,+2] 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -0.0121 0.2435 0.0101 0.6235 
Media Pessimism -0.9362* 0.0545 -1.5047*** 0.0048 
Media Coverage 0.0054 0.1299 0.0010 0.8089 
Premium   -0.0224 0.1430 
Interest Coverage   0.0949* 0.0789 
Profit   0.0593 0.3702 
Pure Cash   0.0047 0.6652 
Relative Size   -0.0844*** 0.0001 
Market-to-Book Ratio   0.0003 0.8896 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.175 0.128 
Obs. 288 226 
Note: This table shows multivariate regressions with the five-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR[-2,+2]) of acquirers around the takeover announcements as the dependent variable. Both 
the coefficients and p-values are reported. Media Pessimism is the average fraction of negative 
words for all articles reported during the pre-merger period for each acquirer. Media Coverage 
is the average number of news articles reported during the pre-merger period for each acquirer. 
Premium is the four-week premium of each deal recorded by the SDC database. Interest 
Coverage is the ratio of a firm’s EBITDA over its interest expense. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA 
over total assets. Pure Cash refers to the subsample of deals paid purely in cash. Relative Size 
is the total value of the target over acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market 
value of assets over its book value. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The specific models are as follows: 
Model 1 
CAR[−2, +2] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀 
Model 2 
CAR[−2, +2] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝜀 
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Table 5  
Univariate analysis for BHARs. 
 
Panel A BHAR[+25,+252] for the full sample and comparison between subsamples with positive and negative attitude. 
 Full Sample Positive Media Attitude Negative Media Attitude Differences 
 Obs. Mean P-Value Obs. Mean P-Value Obs. Mean P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 284 -14.59%*** 0.0001 120 -12.20%*** 0.0081 164 -17.93%*** 0.0001 5.73% 0.3570 
Pure Cash 123 -6.62%* 0.0836 57 -0.08% 0.9893 66 -13.33%*** 0.0074 13.24%* 0.0885 
Pure Stock 54 -22.46%*** 0.0056 22 -17.46% 0.1370 32 -30.25%*** 0.0096 12.79% 0.4245 
Mixed 107 -19.76%*** 0.0005 39 -21.21%*** 0.0059 68 -18.00%** 0.0433 -3.21% 0.7770 
 
Panel B Comparison of BHAR[+25,+252] between subsamples with high and low media coverage. 
Note: This table shows the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR[+25,+252]) for all acquirers after the deal is completed. The abnormal return is 
estimated using the Carhart (1997) model, and the estimation window is [-346, -91]. Panel A reports the BHARs of the full sample and two subsamples divided 
by the sample median of Media Pessimism. Panel B reports the comparison results between two subsamples divided by the sample median of Media Coverage. 
Pure Cash refers to the subsample of deals paid purely in cash. Pure Stock refers to the subsample of deals paid purely in stocks. Mixed refers to the subsample 
of the rest of the deals. This table also provides results of the t-test for the difference of mean values between subgroups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage Differences 
 Obs. Mean P-Value Obs. Mean P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 123 -12.62%*** 0.0009 161 -17.38%*** 0.0006 4.76% 0.4438 
Cash 48 -8.36% 0.1159 75 -6.00% 0.3049 -2.36% 0.7622 
Stock 20 -25.11%* 0.0589 34 -21.93%** 0.0409 -3.18% 0.8446 
Mixed 55 -12.58%** 0.0209 52 -26.94%*** 0.0087 14.35% 0.2033 
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Table 6  
Multivariate regression analysis for BHARs. 
 
Dependent variable BHAR[+25, +126] BHAR[+25, +252] 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 0.0333 0.6993 -0.1049 0.5596 
Media Pessimism -5.0076* 0.0842 -10.884* 0.0717 
Media Coverage -0.0119 0.4121 0.0465 0.1230 
Premium 0.0732 0.2032 -0.0378 0.7516 
Interest Coverage -0.3295 0.1297 0.7156 0.1143 
Profit 0.2102 0.3993 1.0599** 0.0421 
Pure Cash 0.0532 0.1961 0.1437* 0.0941 
Relative Size 0.0344 0.6416 -0.0446 0.7721 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0123* 0.0826 -0.0670*** 0.0001 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.129 0.161 
Obs. 221 221 
Note: This table shows multivariate regressions with the 6- and 12-month buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR[+25,+126] and BHAR[+25,+252]) for all acquirers after the deal is 
completed as the dependent variables. Both the coefficients and p-values are reported. Media 
Pessimism is the average fraction of negative words for all articles reported during the pre-
merger period for each acquirer. Media Coverage is the average number of news articles 
reported during the pre-merger period for each acquirer. Premium is the four-week premium of 
each deal recorded by the SDC database. Interest Coverage is the ratio of a firm’s EBITDA 
over its interest expense. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA over total assets. Pure Cash refers to the 
subsample of deals paid purely in cash. Relative Size is the total value of the target over 
acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market value of assets over its book value. 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The specific models 
are as follows: 
Model 1 
BHAR[+25, +126]
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝜀 
Model 2 
BHAR[+25, +252]
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝜀 
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Table 7  
Multivariate regression analysis for bid premium. 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 0.2683*** 0.0001 0.1320** 0.0298 
Media Pessimism 3.3359* 0.0978 3.8314* 0.0773 
Media Coverage 0.0290* 0.0523 0.0343** 0.0337 
Tender Offer   0.2460*** 0.0001 
Pure Stock   0.0403 0.4534 
Compete Deal   -0.0803 0.3268 
Profit   0.2886 0.1851 
Market-to-Book Ratio   0.0003 0.9437 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.183 0.224 
Obs. 278 246 
Note: This table shows multivariate regressions with the four-week bid premium as the 
dependent variable. Both coefficients and p-values are reported. Media Pessimism is the 
average fraction of negative words for all articles reported during the pre-merger period for 
each acquirer. Media Coverage is the average number of news articles reported during the pre-
merger period for each acquirer. Tender Offer is an indicator that equals one if the acquirer 
makes a tender offer for a target, and zero otherwise. Pure Stock is an indicator that equals one 
if the deal is paid 100% in stock, and zero otherwise. Compete Deal is an indicator that equals 
one if there exists a competing deal, and zero otherwise. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA over total 
assets. Pure Cash refers to the subsample of deals paid purely in cash. Relative Size is the total 
value of the target over acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market value of 
assets over its book value. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The specific models are as follows: 
Model 1 
Premium = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀 
Model 2 
Premium = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜
− 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +  𝜀 
